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"[...] great delays in industrialization tend to allow time for social tensions to
develop and to assume sinister proportions." (Gerschenkron, 1962: 28)
I. Introduction
Human history is marked by social and political upheaval and violence, and we are regularly
confronted with images of mass demonstrations, civil unrest, and conict. In this article, we
develop and test a hypothesis on how relative economic backwardness a¤ects social unrest
and armed conict, inspired by a classic essay by Alexander Gerschenkron (1962),1 and thus
add to the understanding of the economic origins of social tension and organized political
violence.
Gerschenkrons work was published at a time when income gaps and economic backward-
ness between countries around the world were on the rise. The end of the colonial era across
Africa and many parts of Asia brought a large number of newly independent  and very
poor nations onto the global stage. Many of these countries have still not seen economic
take-o¤ and lag ever further behind the most highly developed nations. We contend that
Gerschenkrons insights into how economic backwardness can contribute to the emergence of
social tension and large-scale violence are still useful today, particularly when combined with
the concept of international comparison and status-seeking behavior.
In this article, we make three important contributions to the existing literature on the
causes of social unrest. First, in our analysis we distinguish between relative and absolute
economic development. Second, we consider both nonviolent and violent forms of social
tension, including armed civil conict. Third, we introduce two entirely novel instruments 
mailing speed and telegram charges around 1900 to determine the e¤ect of backwardness
on social tension.
Our focus is on a measure of between-country inequality. We interpret economic back-
wardness in terms of a countrys distance from the world development frontier: it is a measure
1We refer to the collection of essays titled "Economic backwardness in historical perspective", published
in 1962, which includes the title essay (rst published in 1951) and other related essays.
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of relative economic (under-) development that includes technological know-how, welfare, and
consumption possibilities.2 Particularly in an era of the globalization of information, a back-
ward countrys poor or underprivileged population compares its situation not only with that
of its better-o¤ co-nationals, but also with the situation of peers in neighboring countries and
places farther aeld (James, 1987; Valente, 2009). An unfavorable comparison, coupled with
a political regimes inability or unwillingness to respond to growing popular discontent, can
then lead to a dangerous build-up of social tension. We propose that the greater a countrys
economic backwardness with respect to the development leader, the higher its probability of
witnessing organized forms of social tension such as mass demonstrations for political regime
change, or even armed civil conict.
We empirically test the hypothesized link between economic backwardness and social
tension at the country-year level for the post-WWII period by using new data on violent
and nonviolent mass movements (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013), as well as established data
on armed civil conict from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict Dataset (Gleditsch et al.,
2002). Our indicator of backwardness is a simple measure of a countrys distance to the
world economic (and technological) leader: we use the ratio of a countrys per-capita income
relative to that in the United States.
Across a series of pooled OLS estimations, we nd that economic backwardness is an
important and hitherto neglected factor particularly in explaining the onset of nonviolent and
any type of mass movements, and to a lesser degree also of armed conict. In a second step,
we take potential endogeneity issues seriously by instrumenting our backwardness measure
together with income per capita. We use the minimum physical distance to either London
or Washington, D.C., and mailing speed and telegram charges around 1900 as instruments.
Linear two-stage estimations reinforce our ndings of a positive link between backwardness
and the probability of witnessing new violent and nonviolent mass movements, and suggest
moreover that backwardness is endogenous. Instrumental variables (IV) results for armed
2We discuss within-country inequality and how it relates to backwardness and conict in Section 2. Our
concept of economic backwardness is similar to distance to the technological frontier found in the recent
growth literature (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2006, Madsen et al., 2010).
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conict onset remain weak, but still show a clear positive relationship with backwardness.
In addition, we nd some evidence that the impact of backwardness has been on the
increase in recent decades, coinciding with deepening globalization and the rise of the in-
ternet. This supports the idea that between-country inequality is an important conict-
generating mechanism. Our proposition is further supported by the fact that our measure
for backwardness is robust to controlling for several other mechanisms, including income and
within-country inequality levels. Overall, our results suggest that backwardness is a new and
complementary factor that can help us explain the onset of social unrest across countries.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theory and testable
hypothesis; Section 3 describes the data and methodology; Section 4 discusses the results of
the empirical analysis; and Section 5 concludes.
II. On economic backwardness and social tension
Gerschenkron (1962) studied the history of industrialization in Europe up to the mid-20th
century and pointed out that Russias "delayed industrial revolution" was to blame for the
violent revolution of 1917 and the subsequent establishment of the dictatorial Soviet govern-
ment (ibid.: 28). Had Russian serfdom been abolished earlier than it was, he hypothesized,
the discontent among the peasantry that was the driving force behind the Russian Revolution
would not have built up as it did, and economic development would have come about more
gradually. He wrote that "[i]f the Soviet experience teaches anything, it is that it demon-
strates ad oculos the formidable dangers inherent in our time in the existence of economic
backwardness" (ibid.: 29). He later generalized this observation to state that delayed indus-
trialization would lead to "mounting tension between the prevailing economic conditions and
the promise o¤ered by rapid industrial developments" (ibid.: 362).3 Gerschenkron alludes to
3It is worth noting that there are three aspects that Gerschenkron found particularly important for indus-
trialization and the level of economic backwardness. The rst is the institutional set-up, from basic political
unication to corruption of the bureaucracy, which is also underlined in the recent literature on institutions
and development (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). The second concerns country-specic characteristics
such as the presence of natural resources, which favors industrialization. The third and nal aspect is the
intellectual climate, mainly dened by political ideology, and in particular varying avors of socialist ideology.
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the fact that economic backwardness is a between-country concept whose main determining
factor is a countrys relative level of industrialization, the benchmark for comparison for the
pre-WWII period being England.4
A delay in industrialization, and consequently in economic progress and potential social
change it entails, could be a deliberate policy pursued by the political leaders.5 A few years
after the Russian Revolution, Edwards (1927: 3) stated that all revolutions stem from the
"repression of [peoples] elemental wishes", their ideas and ambitions, and that the greater
the repression, the greater the violence during revolutions. Such delaying tactics by the ruling
élites were employed for example in Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Russia (Gerschenkron,
1962). They were also part of the French colonial policies, which sought to avoid competition
for the French economy by dominated territories industries; belated attempts at industri-
alization of the colonies by the Vichy regime proved only half-hearted (Coquery-Vidrovitch,
1981). Such obstructionist policies are not conned to the pre-WWII or colonial period.
For example, Ekundare (1981) shows how post-colonial Nigerian development policies were
hostage to socio-political constraints, particularly regional and ethnic politics, which de-
liberately or not delayed industrialization and economic development. Unfortunately, the
delayed economic progress, be it intentional or not, can result in a discontented population;
the tensions created by the lack of economic development could erupt into bloody conict, as
witnessed in Russia.
In order to distill Gerschenkrons ideas into a theory of economic backwardness and social
tension, we are missing one crucial element: the comparison with the frontier. The notion that
there is awareness on the part of a (large section of a) countrys population of the position on
the ladder of relative backwardness is implicit in Gerschenkrons writings. However, we can
theoretically question the desire for catching-up (and even for freedom from suppression) in
the under-developed country. Why should there be mounting discontent among a suppressed
We take these aspects into account in our empirical approach below when choosing the control variables.
4For example, "...it is the history of advanced or established industrial countries which traces out the road
of development for the more backward countries" (Gerschenkron, 1962: 6).
5The political perspective of economic backwardness was formalized by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).
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entrepreneurship and labor force in a backward country? Why should they seek development
in the rst place and not be satised with the status quo, even as the economic development
frontier moves farther and farther away?
We believe the answer lies in human beingstendency for interpersonal comparison and
their desire for status (Veblen, 1899). Commonly referred to as "keeping up with the Jone-
ses", this behavior has been shown to apply not only to individuals within a country (see,
e.g., Duesenberry, 1949; Frank, 1997; Alvarez-Cuadrado et al., 2004), but also at the inter-
national level. Individuals in underdeveloped, backward countries compare their situation
with that of peers in advanced countries and seek to catch up with them.6 Although the
awareness of relative status and development has plausibly been accentuated by the rapid
pace of globalization and spread of the internet during the most recent decades, James (1987)
argues that this comparison has been present for longer. He cites education, work in foreign
rmsa¢ liates, advertising, and historical contact through colonialism as potential mech-
anisms for "positional taste transfer" (ibid.: 455). Valente (2009) shows formally how the
incorporation of preferences for international status-seeking into a growth model can a¤ect
convergence in growth rates and income levels, and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2015)
include international comparisons into a model of public-good provision and international tax
coordination. The literature on international comparisons and keeping-up behavior points in
a clear direction: individuals in poorer countries not only look to better-o¤ countries for their
role models, but actively seek to emulate these models.
Based on our theoretical arguments, we propose the following testable hypothesis: Greater
relative economic backwardness compared to other countries will, all else equal, lead to a
higher probability of experiencing episodes of mass civil unrest.
We do not contend of course that economic backwardness is the main culprit for mass
demonstrations and armed civil conict, nor can we pretend to nd incontrovertible evidence
6Gurrs (1970) theory on "aspirational deprivation" as a source of rebellion is closely related to ours. He
argues that rising aspirations are born from exposure to new modes of life through modernization, especially
mass communications media, and the spread of literacy and Western-style education. But he does not explain
why people harbor these aspirations in the rst place, or why they would rebel if their own situation had not
objectively deteriorated.
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in favor of our theory. Instead, we believe that our theory complements others on the origins
of conict, and in our estimations we control for a set of leading alternative explanations.
Importantly, economic backwardness is related to, but distinct from income per capita (i.e.,
income levels), which has proven to be one of the most robust explanatory factors in cross-
country armed conict studies.7 Several recent contributions have tried to disentangle the
causal links between income levels, or income growth, and conict outcomes by using IV
estimations (e.g., Miguel et al., 2004; Brückner and Ciccone, 2010; Bergholt and Lujala,
2012). Therefore, we include income per capita in our estimations and instrument it alongside
relative backwardness.
Economic backwardness, or between-country inequality, is also distinct fromwithin-country
inequality as a potential driver of conict. The idea that an inequitable distribution of re-
sources across a population contributes to the emergence of discontent and violence goes
back to the Ancient Greek philosophers.8 Data challenges in empirical studies especially
concerning inequality have however meant that no consensus has been reached on this class-
based theory. Many recent contributions instead focus on inequality between ethnic groups
or other types of inequality.9 Backwardness understood as between-country inequality could
inuence within-country inequality: we might expect the delaying tactics by the élites de-
scribed above to result in greater income inequality within a country, which in turn could
a¤ect conict emergence. At best then, backwardness would have an indirect e¤ect on social
tension. However, recent evidence shows that developing countries are not necessarily more
unequal than developed ones the reality may in fact be the opposite (e.g., Piketty, 2014).
We try to control for these e¤ects by including a measure of income inequality, as well as
ethnic fractionalization, in our estimations.
There is little consensus on what factors are most robustly linked to the onset of nonviolent
7For a useful review of the conict literature, see Blattman and Miguel (2010).
8See Cramer (2005) for an interesting historical discussion and literature review.
9Esteban and Ray (2011) present a theoretical model that includes ethnic polarization, fractionalization
and inequality as determinants of conict incidence. This model is tested empirically by Esteban et al. (2012)
where, contrary to the theoretical prediction, greater inequality between ethnic groups (weakly) decreases
conict incidence. Caprioli (2005) nds that countries with higher levels of gender inequality are more likely
to experience intrastate conict.
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conicts; and to our knowledge, no contribution to date attempts to establish causality.
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) and Svensson and Lindgren (2011) study the particularities
of nonviolent civil resistance and their outcomes. Two other articles use the same dataset
we employ to measure nonviolent conict: Gleditsch and Rivera (2015) show that there is
signicant di¤usion of nonviolent campaigns between neighboring states, and Butcher and
Svensson (2016) show that modernization dened in terms of absolute development and
measured by the share of manufacturing value-added in GDP is positively related to the
onset of nonviolent campaigns. Using a di¤erent dataset, Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) nd
that youth bulges, regional contagion and (the lack of) civil liberties present the strongest
relation to nonviolent uprisings, but that measures of modernization  including the GDP
share of manufacturing (and services) are not strongly linked to nonviolent uprisings.
III. Empirical approach and data description
Methodology
In order to test our hypothesis, we adopt a two-pronged approach. First, we use linear
estimations to establish the basic relationship, concentrating on pooled OLS estimations.10
We estimate the following basic model:11
social tensionit = a+ bT + 1  backwardnessit 1 + 2  incomepcit 1 + 3 Xit 1 + it: (1)
We have a range of zero-one dummies as our dependent variable social tension in year
10We show the parsimonious baseline specications using pooled logit in Table 2 of the Online Appendix
for comparison with the most common approach in the conict literature.
11We do not include country xed e¤ects: in the context of rare-event data such as conict or civil unrest
onset, the use of country xed e¤ects discards over 90 percent of the information available, essentially assuming
that countries that were peaceful throughout the period have some idiosyncratic feature (see e.g., Beck
and Katz, 2001). This implies that we rely on between-country variation to identify e¤ects of economic
backwardness. To test this point, we collapse our dataset into a pure cross-section and nd similar results in
both OLS and 2SLS estimations, see Tables 24-25 in the Online Appendix.
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t in country i. Our interest is mainly on the backwardness indicator and its coe¢ cient 1.
However, absolute development is also important: income per capita has been found to be
the most robust explanatory variable in the armed conict literature. It is moreover a proxy
for modernization, one explanation for the emergence of nonviolent conict. We will therefore
pay particular attention also to the coe¢ cient 2.12 The vector X includes other common
suspects from the violent and nonviolent conict literature, as well as variables derived from
the theory above; all are described in more detail below. a is the constant term, b are common
dummies for decade T , and  the error term. We report robust standard errors clustered at
the country level in all tables. For logical reasons and as a rst step towards addressing
endogeneity issues, we lag most time-varying variables by one year (exceptions are the Cold
War and socialist country dummies, and time since independence and since the last conict
ended).
However, this approach leaves some open questions regarding the endogeneity not only
of our main explanatory variable, relative backwardness, but also of income per capita. In
particular, we have to consider the possibility of reverse causality. Economic backwardness is a
slow-changing variable, and a one-year lag cannot exclude potential reverse-causality issues:
social tension can build up over many years and are up several times if the underlying
problems are not resolved, a pattern which in turn could a¤ect backwardness, as conict
becomes a setback for development. Similarly, income per capita is also likely to be a¤ected
by reverse causality, as (the threat of) conict whether violent or not is quickly mirrored
by the economy, for example, due to the pull-out of investment in uncertain times. In both
instances, the bias is likely to augment the e¤ect on social tension and drive results in our
favor. In addition, while we add a wide variety of control variables, it is impossible to exclude
completely the possibility of omitted variable bias.
Our second strategy explicitly deals with endogeneity by instrumenting economic back-
wardness and per capita income in a series of pooled two-stage least squares (2SLS) esti-
12Backwardness and income per capita are of course highly correlated. In robustness tests, we drop income
per capita and nd even stronger results for backwardness alone (see the Online Appendix, Tables 14-16).
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mations. In addition to a second stage similar to equation (1) above, we add rst-stage
estimations of economic backwardness and per capita income levels:
backwardnessit 1 = c+ bT + 1  Ii + 2 Xit 1 + "it: (2)
incomepcit 1 = d+ bT + 3  Ii + 4 Xit 1 + !it: (3)
We have a total of three di¤erent instruments I at our disposal, which allows us to achieve
a strong rst-stage identication and to test for overidentifying restrictions. In Eq. 2 and 3,
c and d are constant terms, b are decade dummies, " and ! denote error terms, and X is a
vector of control variables as described above.
Data description
Our panel dataset covers the years 1946-2011 and includes up to 163 independent states and
over 7,800 country-years. The dataset contains countries for which we have economic data
and Polity IV data for regime type (Marshall et al., 2016), and that had a population larger
than 500,000 in 2012. Summary statistics are presented in the Online Appendix (henceforth
OA), Table 1.13
Dependent variables. We use three measures for social tension, our dependent vari-
able, to test our hypothesis. The variables come from two separate datasets with di¤erent
denitions of conict, providing a good robustness test for our hypothesis.
The rst two measures cover both violent and nonviolent forms of social unrest and are
taken from a new panel dataset on nonviolent and violent campaign onsets the NAVCO 2.0
dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013). NAVCO 2.0 data is available for the period 1946-2006
and includes all sustained mass movements or "campaigns" that have a clear maximalist
(political) objective (such as expelling a foreign occupier, secession, or changing a regime), at
least 1,000 participants, and recognizable leadership. Short-lived movements, as well as most
13Replication data and detailed replication instructions are available on the authorswebsites. All analyses
were conducted in STATA 14.
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coups détat, are not included. This denition well accords with our theory on widespread
social tension stemming from economic backwardness.
The dataset includes campaigns that are observable in the sense that tactics used by the
participants are overt and documented. To be coded as a nonviolent campaign, the mass
movement must rely primarily on nonviolent tactics such as boycotts and civil disobedience,
and it must not seek to threaten or harm the opponent. Conversely, violent campaigns
primarily rely on violent tactics with at least 1,000 campaign-related deaths. This means
that some violence can occur in a nonviolent campaign, but it cannot be the campaigns
main means to the end.14 In total, the NAVCO dataset has 251 campaign onsets, of which
142 are violent. Our dataset includes 216 NAVCO onsets (we do not consider independence
campaigns in colonial countries), of which 90 are nonviolent onsets. We will focus on the
onset of nonviolent and of any type of campaign as two of our dependent variables.15
We also use information on the onset of armed civil conict from the annually updated
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict Dataset, which covers the period 19462014 (Gleditsch et al.,
2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015; version v.4-2015). We include all internal and inter-
nationalized internal conicts using the lower threshold of 25 annual battle-related deaths.
An onset is coded one if there is a new conict, or if there has been a reactivation of a conict
that has been inactive for more than two calendar years. In total, our dataset has 290 armed
conict onsets. The correlation between violent campaigns recorded in the NAVCO dataset
and armed civil conicts in the UCDP/PRIO dataset is 0.28; there are 58 country-years that
are recorded in both datasets.
A country with an ongoing conict (campaign) can experience a new conict outbreak:
we therefore do not drop years with ongoing conict (campaign), keeping our full sample
size. This means that the subsequent years with ongoing conict (campaign) without a
new outbreak  are coded as zero. To control for the possibility that a country that is
already experiencing conict (campaign) has a di¤erent likelihood of experiencing a new
14An important point is that the denition of violent and nonviolent campaigns focuses on the strategy of
the mass movement, not on the answering strategy of the government, which may always be violent.
15Baseline results for violent NAVCO campaign onsets tend to be weaker, see OA, Table 19.
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conict (campaign), we add a dummy variable that denotes the conict (campaign) status
in the country in the previous year. To control for the fact that countries that recently have
experienced conict are in general more likely to experience a new conict, we also include a
count variable for the calendar years without any conict since the end of the latest conict
(in logs), as suggested by Beck et al. (1998).16
Economic backwardness. Our main independent variable of interest is the proxy for
relative economic backwardness (Backwardness). Gerschenkron himself proposed "the size
of per capita income" as a natural starting point to compare backwardness (Gerschenkron,
1970: 99). We construct a yearly backwardness measure based on the ratio of a countrys
GDP per capita to the GDP per capita of the technology leader the U.S. in the post-WWII
period. The ratio is constructed using Maddison data (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013), with GDP
per capita measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis (Purchasing-Power-Parity-adjusted)
dollar terms. The data is available on a yearly basis from 1800-2010 for 163 countries.
The ratio can take values larger than 1 because a handful of countries have higher GDP
per capita than the U.S. in some years. To ease interpretation of the results, the ratio is
multiplied by -1, so that higher values correspond to greater backwardness. This means that
we expect backwardness to be positively linked to social tension. The countries with the
largest ratios (that is, the most backward countries) in the rst decade of the 21st century
are the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Burundi, Niger, Chad and
the Central African Republic.
Other covariates. There are many common explanatory variables used in the armed
and nonviolent conict literature, as well as some specic ones, that have proven signicant.
Common factors include the (natural logarithm of) real GDP per capita (Income pc), the
single most robust covariate from the empirical conict literature. Yearly per-capita real GDP
growth (Growth) and the (natural log of) population size (Population) are also in common;
data for all three measures come from the Maddison dataset.17 Political institutions play a
16For the NAVCO dataset, we include the years of peace since the end of the last campaign of any type.
17We completed missing population data in the Maddison dataset (Germany 1991-2011, Yugoslavia 1992,
Montenegro 2007-2011, Ethiopia 1951-1992, Yemen 1951-1989, Vietnam 1955-1975) with data from the World
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salient role in explaining all forms of conict: we use the revised "polity2" variable (Polity)
from the Polity IV dataset, which varies from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic).
To measure non-linear e¤ects of Polity, we also construct regime-type dummies by assigning
the country to be an Autocracy if the original "polity" score is smaller than -5; a Democracy if
the "polity" score is larger than 5; and an Anocracy for all the other "polity" scores, including
those coded as missing.
Other variables include data on Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic fractionalization from
Alesina et al. (2003) to control for the grievance e¤ects of ethnic divides. Income Inequality is
measured by the Gini coe¢ cient. We use the dataset by Solt (2016), which provides inequal-
ity data comparable across countries (The Standardized World Income Inequality Database
SWIID v.5.1).18 Decade dummies and a post-Cold War dummy control for time e¤ects. Data
on Oil rents from the World Bank Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013, available only
after 1970) tests the resource-curse hypothesis for violent conict (e.g., Brunnschweiler and
Bulte, 2009; Lujala, 2010) and takes into account the importance that Gerschenkron (1962)
gave to the presence of natural resources for industrialization and economic backwardness.
Countries that are very open to trade have been hypothesised to engage less in conict (e.g.,
Bussmann and Schneider, 2007); data for Openness (i.e., GDP share of the sum of imports
and exports) also come from the World Bank Development Indicators. Measures for Civil
liberties from Freedom House and Youth bulges were both obtained from Chenoweth and
Ulfelder (2015), who found them to be particularly important in explaining nonviolent so-
cial conict. The civil liberties index varies from 1 (most liberal) to 7 (least liberal), and
Youth bulges are measured by the proportion of the population aged 15-24 years. A mea-
sure of Contagion has also been found to be important for explaining nonviolent conicts
onset (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2015; Gleditsch and Rivera, 2015). We construct a dummy
variable denoting the occurrence in a given year of another campaign or armed civil conict
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013) and the Penn World Tables (PWT 8.0, Feenstra et al., 2013).
The Maddison dataset includes population data only up until 2008. The years 2009-2011 were extrapolated
using the Maddison data.
18We maximise the available data by interpolating missing years, but inclusion of inequality still substan-
tially reduces our sample size.
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(respectively, for NAVCO and UCDP/PRIO datasets) in the same UN region.19
We also consider several control variables that are directly linked to our theory. Ger-
schenkron (1962) mentions corruption as an obstacle to industrialization. Widespread corrup-
tion may also provide a further reason for mass discontent. We use the political competition
(Polcomp) variable from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2016) as a proxy for corrup-
tion. Our reasoning is that greater political competition leads to greater transparency at all
levels of government, and from there also greater transparency and less corruption within the
non-elected bureaucracy. We use this proxy as, to our knowledge, there is no more direct
measure of corruption available for the entire period. Political competition is a component
variable of the composite "polity" measure, but it is coded on a scale of 0 to 10 (ten being
the most competitive system) and captures a specic aspect of a political regime.20 Ger-
schenkron (1962) also mentioned country-specic culture and particularly a socialist system
as an important factor for the later industrializers. We construct a Socialist dummy based
on Kornai (1992) and completed with information from the CIA Factbook for recent years.
Finally, we also control for time since 1945 or from the year of independence, if this is later
than 1945 (Independence, natural log), since according to the theory, national unication is
a necessary prerequisite for the industrialization process to take o¤. We expect social tension
due to delayed development to increase with time since independence.
Instrumental variables. We use three di¤erent instruments for economic backwardness
and income per capita. Our rst instrument is a simple measure of geographical distance
of a countrys present-day capital from either London or Washington, D.C., whichever is
shorter (Distance, in log kilometers).21 Gerschenkron (1962) pointed out that the temporal
progression of industrialization from England across the channel to France, Germany and
19The UN regions are: Eastern Africa, Middle Africa, North Africa, Southern Africa, Western Africa,
Caribbean, Cantral America, South America, Northern America, Central Asia, Eeastern Asia, Southern Asia,
South-Eastern Asia, Western Asia, Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Western Europe,
Australia and New Zealand, and Melanesia.
20We revise the interregnum authority scores on Polcomp (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) into conventional polity
scores in a similar manner to that used to construct the "polity2" measure (see Marshall et al., 2016: 17
for details). The correlation coe¢ cient between the Polity and Polcomp variables is 0.23, so they are not
measuring the same aspects of political institutions.
21This data is provided by Kristian Gleditsch at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data-5.html.
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then Russia was no mere geographical coincidence, but reected the greater time for di¤usion
of new technologies the further away from the center of industrialization. This conviction is
echoed by Bairoch (1988: 259), who states that "... there is a denite correlation between the
time when the process of change got under way and the distance from England: the countries
nearest to England were as a rule the soonest a¤ected by the Industrial Revolution." Since
our focus is on the period after WWII, when the United States rmly rose to the forefront
as the world technology leader, we add the U.S. capital as the second pole of attraction,
next to London. The closer a country is to either of these two technology and development
leaders, the faster we expect the di¤usion process to have been, and the less backward the
country should be. Following the same logic, countries closer to London or Washington, D.C.
should have higher incomes per capita.
We argue that this instrument is unlikely to a¤ect the social tension outcomes other than
through backwardness or income. One possible objection could invoke military policy: an
intervention by either the U.S. or the UK in a country experiencing episodes of social tension,
and particularly armed civil conict, is more likely the greater the geographical proximity.
However, aspects of Realpolitik have historically played a greater role in such situations than
physical distance, for example in the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, or NATOs intervention
in Libya and its non-intervention in nearby Syria. Political spheres of interestreach beyond
geography, and geographical distance is unlikely to systematically prevent (or encourage) the
eruption of social tension.
Our second instrument is based on mailing times around 1900 from either London or
Washington, D.C. This is, to our knowledge, the rst time this information has been used.
We calculate mailing speed from either London or Washington, D.C whichever is faster
as miles covered per mailing day in 1903 (the rst year after 1900 for which we found
documentation for both the United Kingdom and the United States), using data on mailing
times for regular correspondence (i.e., not packages) in days from Post O¢ ce Department
(1903) and Post O¢ ce (1903).22 Where mailing time information for letters was missing,
22Sometimes we had several cities for one country. In these cases, we chose the city with the shortest
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we used mailing times for parcels from the Post O¢ ce Guide (1903), subtracting three days
(the average additional time for processing bulkier mail). Where this was also missing, we
used extensive additional sources on travel times and transportation routes at the time to
approximate the mailing time between the closest country we had data for and the entry point
or the capital for the country in question. In the remaining cases with no reliable information
at all, we assigned one of three values depending on whether the country could be reached
roughly within 1-2 months, 3-6 months, or longer.23 We divided the mailing days by the
(approximate) miles covered by the correspondence at the time. This distance was given for
all countries listed in Post O¢ ce Department (1903), and supplemented by own calculations
based on mailing route information for the remaining countries, using either the capital or
main entry point for each country (the choice was determined by the information on mailing
times).24 We then took the natural logarithm to construct our nal measure, Mailingspeed,
which is expected to be negatively (positively) linked to backwardness (income).
We argue that mailing times are directly related to economic development and backward-
ness. Not only did it take longer for correspondence to reach the more remote parts of the
world; but at equal distances, letters reached a more developed and better-connected country
before its more "backwater" counterpart. For example, a letter posted in Washington, D.C.
could be read by the recipient in Moscow, Russia a mere ten days later; while a correspondent
in Bolivia would have to wait 37 days to receive written news from the U.S. even though
Bolivias capital is, at around 5,100 miles, physically closer to Washington, D.C. than Moscow
(over 5,500 miles). We do not expect mailing times to have a direct e¤ect on social tension or
violent civil conict. Former colonies might have been more developed on average than their
non-colonial neighbors, and (former) colonies are arguably more likely to have experienced
correspondence time, adjusting our distance calculations accordingly.
23These remaining countries are Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Chad, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mali,
Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, and Tajikistan. A dummy variable for countries where we had
to use own estimates was insignicant. Dropping all own-coded countries for the mailing speed and telegram
charge IVs from the analysis weakens the strength of the mailing speed IV, but results carry through and IVs
remain valid (OA, Table 22). The codebook for the instruments is available on the authorswebsites.
24For sea and navigable rivers we used Google Earth to calculate the distances and for many inland desti-
nations we used the length of railway travel at the time.
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conict of some form in the post-WWII period. However, this link turns out to be tenuous
at best: the correlation of our mailing speed measure with a British colony dummy is 0.05,
and -0.38 for French colonies.
The third instrument is also novel: we use telegram charges around 1900. In the 19th
century, the telegraph had launched "the greatest revolution in communications since the
development of the printing press" (Standage, 1998: 2), and not having access to the telegraph
network soon became a disadvantage for business. There were signicant di¤erences in the
way the telegraph system was used in America and Europe. In America, 80-90 percent of
cables were business-related and telegraph managers were more concerned "about dispatch
than low tari¤s... [In Europe] the telegraph is used principally for social correspondence
(Gardiner Hubbard, quoted in Standage, 1998: 158). There were also di¤erences in the
organization of the telegraph systems on either side of the Atlantic: while largely seen as a
public utility in Europe and consequently run by public monopolists (e.g., by the Post O¢ ce
in the United Kingdom), in America the telegraph networks were privately owned, though by
the start of the 20th century Western Union had a virtual monopoly in the United States.
Telegram pricing principles were however similar across the globe. The cost of sending
a telegram depended on distance and the number of words in the message. Included in the
charge was also the labor cost, right down to the messenger boy (or the telegraph o¢ cer
himself in rural parts) who delivered the telegram from the telegraph o¢ ce to the door of
the receiver (Downey, 2002). The pricing basis was usually for ten words, and then per
word for each additional word (Ross, 1928; Downey, 2002). By the end of the 19th century,
the cost of sending a telegram had been greatly reduced thanks to a combination of widely
expanded cable networks and growing competition with telephones. In the 1870s, charges for
international telegrams were very high: a transatlantic telegram cost £ 20 or around $100 at
the time (Standage, 1998). By 1900 the charge of an international telegram sent, for example,
from London to Bathurst (todays Banjul) in The Gambia (42 pence per word) would have
taken into account not only the distance covered (around 2,700 miles), but also the relatively
poor infrastructure and related extra costs of getting the cable to its recipient in that colonial
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outpost. Sending a telegram several thousand miles further to more developed Bathurst in
New South Wales, Australia would have cost 8 pence less (34 pence per word) than sending
it to the West African Coast.
The data for telegram prices is based on "Charges for foreign and colonial telegrams" in
pence per word as listed in Post O¢ ce (1903). The historical tables are remarkably complete:
we have no available information at all on the charging principle applied for less than two
dozen countries. For these, we combine information from historical maps of telegram networks
with information on the communication routes at the time, compiled to construct our mailing
speed variable (see above), to assign charges based on remoteness. We then take the natural
logarithm to construct our instrument Telegram. The correlation with economic development
is evident from the criteria for telegram pricing: we expect telegram charges to be positively
(negatively) linked to backwardness (income). Our arguments in favor of exogeneity of this
instrument are similar to the ones for the mailing speed variable given above. Any potential
direct e¤ect on social tension in the post-WWII period should be additionally mitigated by
the fact that the use of telegrams went on a sharp decline during the rst decades of the 20th
Century as telephone systems rapidly expanded.
IV. Results
OLS estimations
We will discuss in turn the results using NAVCO and UCDP/PRIO data for our dependent
variable, social tension. Table 1 shows the main OLS results for the NAVCO data. Panel
A shows the ndings for nonviolent campaigns only, while Panel B shows the ndings for
all campaigns. Column 1 gives a parsimonious baseline specication including only the most
robust variables from the conict literature. Columns 2-7 add di¤erent control variables;
Column 8 adds them all together.25
First, we note that backwardness is positive with both dependent variables and that the
25Note that columns 6 and 8 are restricted to the period after 1970 due to oil rent data availability.
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Table 1: Backwardness and social tension: NAVCO campaigns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: nonviolent
Backwardnesst 1 0.023** 0.023** 0.022** 0.022** 0.021** 0.026** 0.046** 0.036**
(2.26) (2 .23) (2 .19) (2 .27) (2 .15) (2 .38) (2 .37) (1 .99)
Incom e p.c.t 1 0.006** 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.007** 0.007 0.007
(2.01) (1 .94) (1 .92) (1 .97) (1 .96) (2 .16) (1 .49) (1 .41)
Populationt 1 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(6.07) (5 .89) (6 .03) (6 .06) (6 .32) (6 .54) (5 .21) (3 .92)
Polityt 1 -0 .001*** -0 .001*** -0 .001*** -0 .001* -0 .001*** -0 .001*** -0 .002*** -0 .002*
(-4 .31) (-4 .12) (-4 .32) (-1 .86) (-4 .02) (-4 .76) (-4 .70) (-1 .92)
Post Cold War -0 .024** -0 .021** -0 .024** -0 .024** -0 .023** -0 .023** -0 .036** -0 .031**
(-2 .30) (-2 .07) (-2 .31) (-2 .29) (-2 .22) (-2 .24) (-2 .39) (-2 .16)
Ethnic frac. 0 .0010 0.013
(0.15) (1 .45)
G rowtht 1 0.012 0.011
(0.83) (0 .30)
Polcompt 1 -0 .0002 -0 .0002
(-0 .22) (-0 .13)
So cia list 0 .013* 0.025**
(1.72) (2 .01)
O il rentst 1 -0 .0003 0.0001
(-1 .27) (0 .028)
Inequalityt 1 -0 .001*** -0 .001**
(-2 .81) (-2 .11)
R2 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.025 0.026
Panel B: al l
Backwardnesst 1 0.020* 0.023* 0.022* 0.020* 0.019 0.017 0.071*** 0.068***
(1.70) (1 .88) (1 .80) (1 .67) (1 .57) (1 .33) (3 .38) (3 .09)
Incom e p.c.t 1 -0 .003 -0 .001 -0 .002 -0 .002 -0 .003 -0 .003 0.004 0.007
(-0 .80) (-0 .28) (-0 .54) (-0 .61) (-0 .93) (-0 .79) (0 .84) (1 .25)
Populationt 1 0.01*** 0.010*** 0.01*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.01***
(6.74) (6 .80) (6 .76) (6 .55) (6 .37) (7 .27) (6 .26) (5 .41)
Polityt 1 -0 .001*** -0 .001** -0 .001*** 0.001 -0 .001** -0 .001*** -0 .002*** 0.0003
(-2 .65) (-2 .61) (-2 .79) (1 .13) (-2 .15) (-3 .45) (-3 .27) (0 .29)
Post Cold War -0 .033** -0 .030** -0 .033** -0 .032** -0 .032** -0 .032** -0 .037** -0 .032**
(-2 .52) (-2 .36) (-2 .53) (-2 .48) (-2 .46) (-2 .47) (-2 .33) (-2 .07)
Ethnic frac. 0 .0097 0.011
(1.08) (0 .89)
G rowtht 1 -0 .047 -0 .067
(-1 .62) (-1 .23)
Polcompt 1 -0 .004** -0 .005**
(-2 .35) (-2 .53)
So cia list 0 .011 0.002
(1.05) (0 .15)
O il rentst 1 -0 .0002 0.00001
(-0 .65) (0 .018)
Inequalityt 1 -0 .001** -0 .001**
(-2 .61) (-2 .13)
Observations 7115 6914 7073 7115 7115 4968 3601 3197
Countries 160 154 159 160 160 160 133 130
R2 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.027 0.028
Notes: All estimations are pooled OLS. The dependent variable in Panel A is the onset of a nonviolent
campaign, and all types of campaigns in Panel B. Backwardness is dened as (GDPpcit=GDPpcUSt)   1.
All specications control for an ongoing episode in the previous year and peace years and include decade
dummies and a constant term (not shown). S.e. are clustered at the country level. Robust t-statistics in
parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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coe¢ cients also have similar magnitudes across most specications. The results are highly
signicant for the nonviolent campaigns, but less so when all campaigns are included. These
initial ndings suggest that economic backwardness indeed has a positive relation especially
with nonviolent social tension.
When we look at the other explanatory variables, we nd one striking di¤erence with
respect to the conventional armed conict literature in the coe¢ cient for income per capita.
What is arguably the strongest and most consistent (violent) conict-reducing factor is now
positive and signicant when considering nonviolent campaigns (Panel A), and insignicant
when it comes to all types of campaigns (Panel B). This suggests two things: rst, social
tension that falls short of outright armed civil conict has to do with relative economic
backwardness and the comparison with the frontier, as well as with absolute income and
the inuence of opportunity costs. Second, more a­ uent countries tend, if at all, to expe-
rience nonviolent campaigns rather than violent ones. A plausible explanation can be that
democratic countries, which also tend to have higher income per capita levels, o¤er more insti-
tutionalized opportunities for the (nonviolent) expression of popular dissent than autocracies
or weak democracies.26
The results for violent civil conict, using the UCDP/PRIO data, are shown in Table
2. Specications are analogous to those in Table 1. Backwardness is positive in most OLS
estimations, but never signicant at the conventional levels. GDP per capita is negative and
mostly signicant, in line with the existing literature.
The remaining covariates show similar results for all measures of social tension. Polity
mostly has a negative and signicant sign for NAVCO campaigns, suggesting that (stronger)
democracies see fewer campaigns on average. It is mostly insignicant for UCDP/PRIO armed
conict onsets. Larger countries, measured by their population size, consistently see more
26Income per capita was also positive (but insignicant) in Chenoweth and Lewis(2013) study on nonvi-
olent campaigns. Collier and Rohner (2008) found that in countries that were below an income threshold,
democracy increased the probability of political violence; conversely, richer democracies saw less political vio-
lence. Exploratory estimations using an interaction term between democracy and backwardness showed that
democratic backward countries were much more likely to see both nonviolent and any form of mass campaign
than non-democratic countries.
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Table 2: Backwardness and social tension: UCDP/PRIO armed conicts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Backwardnesst 1 0.006 0.012 0.006 0.006 0.009 -0.0026 0.011 0.012
(0.34) (0.64) (0.35) (0.32) (0.49) (-0.15) (0.34) (0.35)
Income p.c.t 1 -0.011* -0.007 -0.011* -0.011* -0.011* -0.014** -0.010 -0.012
(-1.93) (-1.17) (-1.78) (-1.93) (-1.84) (-2.41) (-1.20) (-1.17)
Populationt 1 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012** 0.012**
(3.49) (3.60) (3.52) (3.48) (3.67) (3.20) (2.22) (2.19)
Polityt 1 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.001 -0.0002 -0.00003 0.001 0.004*
(0.15) (0.23) (0.11) (0.57) (-0.36) (-0.046) (0.53) (1.72)
Post Cold War -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.052*** -0.046**
(-3.02) (-2.98) (-3.03) (-3.01) (-3.08) (-3.04) (-2.79) (-2.53)
Ethnic frac. 0.023** 0.013
(2.02) (0.76)
Growtht 1 -0.014 0.026
(-0.35) (0.53)
Polcompt 1 -0.001 -0.008**
(-0.62) (-2.43)
Socialist -0.021** -0.050***
(-2.29) (-3.27)
Oil rentst 1 0.001 0.001
(0.91) (1.34)
Inequalityt 1 0.0001 -0.0004
(0.21) (-0.95)
Observations 7745 7524 7707 7745 7740 5645 4088 3674
Countries 162 154 161 162 161 162 136 131
R2 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.031 0.032 0.038
Notes: All estimations are pooled OLS. The dependent variable is the onset of an armed conict. Backward-
ness is dened as (GDPpcit=GDPpcUSt)  1. All specications control for an ongoing conict in the previous
year and peace years and include decade dummies and a constant term (not shown). S.e. are clustered at the
country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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social tension on average, which again conrms the ndings from the armed conict literature.
The strong decreasing trend in the frequency of both violent and nonviolent campaigns since
the end of the Cold War from that literature is also conrmed. Ethnic fractionalization
(column 2) has no e¤ect on nonviolent or all campaigns, but increases the likelihood of armed
civil conict.27 Economic growth (column 3) and oil rents (column 6) show no link with any
form of social tension. In column 7 we include the Gini coe¢ cient as a measure for inequality:
the results for NAVCO campaigns show that countries with higher levels of inequality are less
likely to experience a campaign. The inclusion of inequality more than doubles the magnitude
of backwardness, while nearly halving the sample size.28 Inequality does not have any link to
armed civil conict. Inclusion of all covariates together in column (8) conrms the ndings
from the piecewise additions.
Turning to our other theory-specic covariates, we note that our proxy for corruption
political competition doesnt appear to a¤ect the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns or
armed conict at all, while it has a strong campaign-reducing e¤ect when all campaigns are
considered. This nding is driven by the violent campaigns, and it supports our expectation
that less corruption (i.e., more political competition) is linked to less social unrest. Finally,
socialist countries show an increased frequency of nonviolent mass campaigns and a decreased
frequency of armed conict. This is interesting, as to our knowledge it is the rst time that a
socialism e¤ecthas been considered in the conict and social tension context. It is possible
that this e¤ect is driven by the largely peaceful demonstrations against the Soviet regime in
Central and Eastern Europe during and especially at the end of the Cold War. However,
robustness tests limiting the period of analysis to post-1970 diminish instead of increase the
socialism e¤ect (see below).
27In additional estimations (OA, Tables 8-12), language and religious fractionalization also have no signi-
cant relation with NAVCO campaigns, but language franctionalization is positively linked to armed conict.
28The change is due both to the drop in the number of observations, and the inclusion of inequality.
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Instrumental variables estimations
Although suggestive, the results of the pooled OLS estimations presented above leave open
questions regarding the exogeneity of our main explanatory variable, economic backwardness,
as well as income per capita (see Section 3). Can we further strengthen our conclusions by
drawing a credible causal link between greater economic backwardness and increased proba-
bility of social tension? This is what we do in our pooled 2SLS estimations that use distance
and mailing speed from London or Washington, D.C., and telegram charges as instruments
for backwardness and GDP per capita. The main results are presented in Tables 3-4 for
NAVCO campaigns and in Table 5 for UCDP/PRIO armed civil conicts, with specications
analogous to those of the OLS estimations presented above.
The 2SLS results generally strengthen the ndings from the OLS estimations for back-
wardness: it has a strong, positive e¤ect on the likelihood of a country witnessing a new
nonviolent and any type of campaign included in NAVCO. The only exception is when we
add within-country inequality to explain nonviolent campaign onsets (column 7 in Table 3):
the inclusion decreases the magnitude of the backwardness coe¢ cient and renders it insignif-
icant. Backwardness is again signicant when we add all controls in column 8. Although not
signicant at conventional levels, backwardness positively a¤ects the onset of armed conict,
too.29 Compared with the OLS results, the magnitude of the coe¢ cients for backwardness
has more than tripled for nonviolent campaigns, and increased around six-fold for all types
of campaigns. The change in magnitude for armed conict is even larger, but not signicant.
We also conrm the strong positive e¤ect of income per capita on nonviolent campaign
onset and interestingly nd a similiar positive e¤ect for all forms of mass campaign. Our
2SLS results underline that episodes of social unrest that fall short of armed civil conict, and
especially nonviolent mass movements, are more likely to happen in richer countries. Income
per capita shows no e¤ect on armed conict: the inclusion of relative development has made
the impact of absolute development disappear.
In terms of impact magnitude, the models indicate that backwardness has a substantial
29Signicance levels on the backwardness coe¢ cient are generally between 10-20 percent.
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Table 3: IV estimations: NAVCO nonviolent campaigns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Backwardnesst 1 0.083*** 0.10** 0.084*** 0.081*** 0.073** 0.100*** 0.058 0.091**
(2.85) (2.52) (2.81) (2.79) (2.54) (3.14) (1.39) (2.18)
Income p.c.t 1 0.022*** 0.029** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.018** 0.024*** 0.013 0.017
(2.76) (2.29) (2.70) (2.82) (2.52) (3.09) (1.03) (1.30)
Populationt 1 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(5.96) (5.73) (5.92) (5.96) (6.22) (6.17) (5.02) (3.30)
Polityt 1 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002
(-2.91) (-2.77) (-2.92) (-1.69) (-2.70) (-3.47) (-3.24) (-1.62)
Post Cold War -0.025** -0.023** -0.025** -0.025** -0.024** -0.024** -0.036** -0.032**
(-2.42) (-2.22) (-2.44) (-2.41) (-2.35) (-2.39) (-2.37) (-2.22)
Ethnic frac. 0.013 0.015
(1.11) (1.29)
Growtht 1 -0.001 0.005
(-0.081) (0.12)
Polcompt 1 -0.0004 0.00001
(-0.37) (0.006)
Socialist 0.012 0.021
(1.52) (1.62)
Oil rentst 1 -0.001 -0.0002
(-1.58) (-0.29)
Inequalityt 1 -0.001** -0.001***
(-2.18) (-3.00)
1st st. backwardness
Distance 3.07 3.21 3.05 2.89 3.00 2.85 4.57 4.76
Telegram 2.56 1.68 2.55 2.51 2.70 2.86 0.35 -0.40
Mailingspeed -2.09 -1.68 -2.07 -2.18 -2.29 -2.36 -0.71 -1.45
Excl. instr. F-stat. 17.4 10.4 17.1 17.4 17.4 19.1 10.3 10.5
Partial R2 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.18
1st st. income pc
Distance -1.69 -2.06 -1.72 -1.44 -1.61 -1.00 -2.11 -2.25
Telegram -4.69 -2.77 -4.64 -4.65 -4.83 -4.92 -2.27 -0.90
Mailingspeed 3.28 2.76 3.26 3.42 3.44 4.34 1.90 2.98
Excl. instr. F-stat. 26.1 13.9 25.7 26.6 26.4 33.7 10 9.21
Partial R2 0.25 0.18 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.14 0.14
Hansen J stat. p-val 0.82 0.70 0.82 0.81 0.73 0.70 0.19 0.22
Observations 7115 6914 7073 7115 7115 4968 3601 3197
Countries 160 154 159 160 160 160 133 130
Notes: All estimations are pooled 2SLS. The dependent variable is the onset of a nonviolent campaign in
the NAVCO dataset. Backwardness is dened as (GDPpcit=GDPpcUSt)   1. All specications control for
an ongoing episode in the previous year and peace years and include decade dummies and a constant term
(not shown). First stage information includes IV t-statistics, partial R-squareds, excluded instrumentsF-
statistics, and Hansen J statistic p-value. S.e. are clustered at the country level. Robust z-statistics in
parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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Table 4: IV estimations: NAVCO all campaigns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Backwardnesst 1 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.11** 0.15***
(2.98) (2.95) (3.06) (2.60) (2.71) (2.80) (2.34) (2.78)
Income p.c.t 1 0.020* 0.034** 0.021* 0.017 0.017 0.021* 0.011 0.021
(1.79) (2.10) (1.91) (1.59) (1.49) (1.71) (0.76) (1.24)
Populationt 1 0.0095*** 0.011*** 0.01*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(6.29) (6.41) (6.33) (6.27) (6.10) (6.20) (6.03) (4.47)
Polityt 1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.0004 -0.001** -0.0014* 0.001
(-1.26) (-1.37) (-1.41) (1.43) (-0.91) (-2.06) (-1.86) (0.58)
Post Cold War -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.038** -0.033**
(-2.71) (-2.60) (-2.72) (-2.64) (-2.65) (-2.65) (-2.37) (-2.14)
Ethnic frac. 0.026* 0.014
(1.87) (0.87)
Growtht 1 -0.066** -0.077
(-2.20) (-1.41)
Polcompt 1 -0.004** -0.005**
(-2.19) (-2.38)
Socialist 0.008 -0.002
(0.73) (-0.13)
Oil rentst 1 -0.0004 -0.0002
(-0.86) (-0.23)
Inequalityt 1 -0.001** -0.001***
(-2.56) (-3.02)
1st st. backwardness
Distance 2.96 3.08 2.93 2.80 2.89 2.58 4.35 4.57
Telegram 2.60 1.82 2.60 2.55 2.74 2.98 0.61 -0.010
Mailingspeed -2.14 -1.77 -2.13 -2.23 -2.35 -2.52 -0.77 -1.61
Excl. instr. F-stat. 17.6 10.9 17.4 17.6 17.6 20 11 11.6
Partial R2 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.21
1st st. income pc
Distance -1.46 -1.85 -1.49 -1.22 -1.38 -0.45 -1.70 -1.76
Telegram -4.79 -2.95 -4.75 -4.73 -4.93 -5.01 -2.44 -1.11
Mailingspeed 3.37 2.86 3.35 3.50 3.53 4.56 2 3.12
Excl. instr. F-stat. 26.4 14.6 26 26.7 26.8 35 10.7 9.75
Partial R2 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.30 0.14 0.30
Hansen J stat. p-val 0.74 0.98 0.78 0.80 0.79 0.74 0.45 0.52
Observations 7115 6914 7073 7115 7115 4968 3601 3197
Countries 160 154 159 160 160 160 133 130
Notes: All estimations are pooled 2SLS. The dependent variable is the onset of any type of campaign in
the NAVCO dataset. Backwardness is dened as (GDPpcit=GDPpcUSt)   1. All specications control for
an ongoing episode in the previous year and peace years and include decade dummies and a constant term
(not shown). First stage information includes IV t-statistics, partial R-squareds, excluded instrumentsF-
statistics, and Hansen J statistic p-value. S.e. are clustered at the country level. Robust z-statistics in
parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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e¤ect on social tension, comparable with that of income levels. This can be illustrated by using
a couple of examples from our NAVCO results, which are the most robust. From 1987 onwards
for over a decade, Mexico experienced a series of protests aimed at the government that the
NAVCO dataset codes as a nonviolent campaign. In 1986, Mexicos score for backwardness
was -0.27, which incidentally is also the mean score for backwardness in our dataset. Results
from our baseline model for nonviolent campaigns (Table 3, column 1) suggest that had
Mexico been one standard deviation (0.27) less backward i.e., with a similar score to Israel
(-0.57) and Singapore (-0.51) the risk of the onset of a nonviolent campaign would have been
reduced by 2.2 percentage points. The contrast is even starker when comparing Mexico to
its northern neighbor: being at a par with the United States, the development leader, would
have decreased Mexicos probability of a nonviolent campaign by an additional 3.5 percentage
points, or 5.6 percentage points in total. The impact of income per capita has similiar
magnitude: one standard deviation increase in income per capita increases the likelihood of
nonviolent campaign onset by 2.3 percentage points.
As an illustration for violent campaigns, we can consider the South African rebellion
against apartheid that emerged in 1984 with the introduction of the new constitution. The
movement used both violent and nonviolent methods and is coded as a violent campaign
in the NAVCO dataset. In 1983, South Africas score for backwardness was -0.22, placing it
among the most developed countries in Africa. One standard deviation decrease in that score,
bringing it to the same level as Spain (-0.50), would have lowered the likelihood of conict
by 3.4 percentage points (using the estimate from Table 4, column 1). The impact of income
per capita on all mass movements remains at the same level as for non-violent campaigns.
These are large and substantial impacts considering that the average rates for nonviolent and
all campaign onsets in our dataset are 0.012 and 0.027, respectively.
The control variables have largely similar e¤ects on the chance of witnessing social tension
and armed conict as found in the OLS estimations. Di¤erences include ethnic fractional-
ization, which has a weak campaign-increasing as well as armed conict-increasing e¤ect;
economic growth, which lowers the likelihood of witnessing the onset of all types of NAVCO
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Table 5: IV estimations: UCDP/PRIO armed conict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Backwardnesst 1 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.14* 0.12 0.043 0.068
(1.50) (1.63) (1.49) (1.50) (1.65) (1.44) (0.53) (0.71)
Income p.c.t 1 0.0077 0.025 0.0082 0.0074 0.015 0.014 -0.014 -0.0030
(0.40) (0.91) (0.43) (0.39) (0.72) (0.69) (-0.69) (-0.11)
Populationt 1 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012** 0.013*
(3.51) (3.56) (3.53) (3.50) (3.67) (3.15) (2.22) (1.96)
Polityt 1 0.00074 0.00065 0.00070 0.00096 0.00032 0.00011 0.0013 0.0037*
(1.21) (0.99) (1.14) (0.88) (0.50) (0.13) (1.25) (1.71)
Post Cold War -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.047*** -0.053*** -0.047**
(-3.15) (-3.12) (-3.15) (-3.14) (-3.21) (-3.12) (-2.85) (-2.55)
Ethnic frac. 0.033* 0.014
(1.76) (0.68)
Growtht 1 -0.031 0.020
(-0.80) (0.38)
Polcompt 1 -0.00048 -0.0076**
(-0.23) (-2.38)
Socialist -0.024** -0.054***
(-2.39) (-3.03)
Oil rentst 1 0.00022 0.00062
(0.27) (0.70)
Inequalityt 1 -0.00037 -0.00071
(-0.79) (-1.38)
1st st. backwardness
Distance 3.15 3.23 3.13 3.02 3.08 2.94 4.48 4.70
Telegram 2.26 1.56 2.26 2.24 2.41 2.36 0.080 -0.62
Mailingspeed -1.74 -1.42 -1.74 -1.82 -2.02 -2.08 -0.70 -1.48
Excl. instr. F-stat. 16.2 10.3 16 16.2 16.9 17.3 9.15 9.69
Partial R2 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19
1st st. income pc
Distance -1.83 -2.11 -1.87 -1.65 -1.73 -1.16 -2.28 -2.46
Telegram -4.14 -2.63 -4.11 -4.12 -4.30 -4.14 -1.96 -0.70
Mailingspeed 2.91 2.48 2.91 3.01 3.17 3.90 1.85 2.92
Excl. instr. F-stat. 24.9 14.2 24.7 25.4 26.1 30.5 9.51 9.03
Partial R2 0.23 0.17 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.14 0.15
Hansen J stat. p-val 0.78 0.43 0.73 0.78 0.89 0.34 0.080 0.090
Observations 7745 7524 7707 7745 7740 5645 4088 3674
Countries 162 154 161 162 161 162 136 131
Notes: All estimations are pooled 2SLS. The dependent variable is the onset of an armed conict in the
UCDP/PRIO dataset. Backwardness is dened as (GDPpcit=GDPpcUSt)   1. All specications control
for an ongoing conict in the previous year and peace years and include decade dummies and a constant
term (not shown). First stage information includes IV t-statistics, partial R-squareds, excluded instruments
F-statistics, and Hansen J statistic p-value. S.e. are clustered at the country level. Robust z-statistics in
parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
27
campaigns; and the dummy for socialist countries, which is only signicantly decreasing armed
conict onset.
Instrument validity and sensitivity analysis
Our causal interpretation of the e¤ects of economic backwardness and income per capita in
the 2SLS estimations rests on the validity of our instruments. In addition to our theoretical
arguments given in Section 3, we also consider a range of more formal tests of this point. All
2SLS tables provide rst-stage instrument t-statistics, excluded instrument F-statistics, and
Hansen J test p-values at the bottom. The Hansen J test for over-identifying restrictions can
never reject the joint null hypothesis that our three instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated
with the error term, and that they are correctly excluded from the second-stage equation
for NAVCO results. In the case of the UCDP/PRIO armed conicts, the test rejects the
joint null hypothesis at p=0.1 level when within country inequality is included in the model
(columns 7 and 8, Table 5).
The instrument t-statistics show that our instruments are strong and a¤ect backwardness
and income in the expected manner. The distance variable proves to be a slightly better
instrument for backwardness than income per capita, while mailing speeds around 1900 show
a stronger link with income per capita. Telegram charges around 1900 are a good instrument
for both endogenous variables across most specications. The partial r-squareds for both rst-
stage estimations are comfortably high, generally ranging between 0.14-0.30, showing that our
combination of instruments is able to capture a good part of the variation in backwardness
and income per capita. The excluded instrument F-statistics also give reassurance that the
inference is robust to the possibility of weak instruments: in our main tables, they are always
above 10 (the generally accepted rule of thumbvalue), the only exception again being when
within-country inequality is included in the UCDP/PRIO armed conict models.30
30Stock-Yogo weak identication test statistics suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
true signicance level of hypothesis tests based on 2SLS is below 20 percent in most cases. However, given
our use of clustered s.e., the exact critical values that apply are in fact unknown, which is why we prefer to
use the excluded instrument F-statistics as our test of weak identication (see Baum et al., 2007 for a formal
discussion).
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To further test the validity of our instruments, we conduct additional analyses.31 To check
the validity of our distance IV, we substitute it with alternative measures and nd that our
results hold (OA, Table 17).32 Mailing times and telegram charges could be a¤ected by either
conicts that occured in the 19th century which possibly correlate with the probability
of seeing conict after WWII  or by a co-determinant of conict. To check the former,
we controlled for historical conict between 1816-1910 (OA, Table 20). To check the latter,
we added dummies for colonial status, or for being a British or French colony in 1903, as
this could a¤ect not only development, but also social tension (OA, Table 21). We further
control for trade, since geographical proximity a¤ects trade intensity and development, and
potentially armed conict (Bussmann and Schneider, 2007; see OA, Tables 8-13). Results
are robust in all cases. We also add the instruments one-by-one and in pairs taking each
endogenous variable separately; again, the instruments perform well and results are largely
consistent (OA, Tables 14-16).33 Finally, all three instruments are time-invariant, which
might reduce their validity especially in more recent years. However, their relation to the
endogenous variables is surprisingly strong and consistent over time (OA, Figure 1). In sum,
although we can never fully rule out all threats to identication, our instruments appear to
be valid.34
In further sensitivity tests, we rst restrict the sample period to after 1970 (OA, Tables
3-7). Rising globalization has made the comparison with other countries easier and more
31We thank the Editor and three anonymous reviewers for suggesting these tests.
32We use only distance to Washington, D.C and nd very similar results to the ones using minimum
distance to Washington, D.C. or London. Using placebo distances to Russia, China, or Brazil as a substitute
IV instead did not work, strengthening our argument on the role of proximity to the technological leaders.
Finally, distance to Nigeria one of the least developed regions in the world worked with opposite signs,
again supporting our argument.
33Backwardness on its own is no longer a signicant determinant of nonviolent campaign onset, but is highly
signicant in the case of all types of campaign and armed conicts: without controlling for development levels,
relative development appears to strongly a¤ect violent forms of social tension. Income per capita on its own
instead has no e¤ect on the onset of nonviolent campaigns, but signicantly reduces the likelihood of onset
of any type of campaign and of armed conict.
34For example, we cannot exclude that better channels of communication around 1900 (i.e., faster mailing
times and cheaper telegram charges) inuenced the spread of ideas, including revolutionary ones; and that a
revolutionary seed planted at the turn of the 20th century persisted until after WWII. Also, our instruments
may be a¤ected by measurement error even where we have detailed archival information on mailing times
and telegram charges.
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immediate and it is thus plausible that the importance of economic backwardness as an ex-
planatory factor for social tension has been on the increase in more recent decades. The
results show this to be the case for nonviolent campaign onsets: the magnitude of the coef-
cients is larger compared with the results from the full time period. Results for all types
of campaigns and for armed conict do not change substantially. We also include di¤erent
control variables, namely years since independence; language and religious fractionalization
instead of ethnic fractionalization; dummies for autocracy and democracy instead of Polity;35
contagion e¤ects; youth bulges; and civil liberties (OA, Tables 8-13).36 None of these much
a¤ects our results, with the exception of youth bulges: albeit not signicant themselves, their
inclusion generally weakens our ndings. Substituting decade dummies with year dummies
also has little e¤ect on the results (OA, Table 18).
We further test our theory using two measures of civil war onset as the dependent variable,
taking data from the Correlates of War and the UCDP/PRIO databases, both with similarly
coded intra-state conicts with at least 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a
twelve-month period. Both backwardness and income per capita are insignicant (OA, Table
23). This is in line with many previous studies on the determinants of armed conict, where
results for fullblown civil war are generally weak.
Finally, we collapse our data into a cross-country dataset by using variable means for the
period 1946-2011 for each country (OA, Tables 24-25). The cross-country OLS results for
backwardness are often even stronger than those of the pooled regressions; and backwardness
has a positive and signicant impact on all types of civil unrest, including violent campaigns
and armed civil conict, in 2SLS estimations.37
35Democracies have a clear tendency to experience fewer episodes of nonviolent and violent campaigns, with
highly signicant, negative coe¢ cients. Autocracies also see fewer campaigns in general, but they are neither
more nor less likely to see nonviolent forms of mass protest than other political systems. Both democracies
and autocracies show a weak tendency to experience fewer armed conicts. These ndings are consistent
with the non-linear relationship between political regimes and social unrest that has been found in the armed
conict literature, where weak regime types (i.e., anocracies) are most prone to experience civil conict.
36Civil liberties and nonviolent campaigns have an inverted U-shape relation in pooled OLS estimations,
as in Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015): the countries in which people have the least and most civil rights are
less likely to experience a campaign onset.
37Because of the much smaller sample size, rst stage results are weaker in cross-section 2SLS regressions.
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V. Conclusions
In this paper we extend and investigate the idea rst put forward by Gerschenkron (1962) that
economic backwardness can increase the emergence of social tension. Our paper has three
novel points: rst, we develop a theory that combines insights from economic history and
political economy with recent ndings on individualstendency for international comparison
and status-seeking. Economic backwardness, dened as relative economic under-development
or distance from the technology and development frontier, increases the likelihood of wit-
nessing outbursts of social tension among a population whose desire for keeping-up with the
development leader is being frustrated. The inability to escape from backwardness may be
due to political ineptitude, or the outright suppression of entrepreneurial activity, which is
perceived by the élites as a potential threat to the status quo.
Second, we test our hypothesis on the link between economic backwardness and social
tension empirically, using new data on nonviolent and violent forms of mass movements, and
established data on armed civil conict. Third, our approach includes not only pooled OLS
estimations, but also two-stage least squares estimations to determine causality. The latter
address the potential endogeneity of backwardness and income per capita by using three
instruments, two of which are entirely novel.
The results strongly suggest that economic backwardness contributes to the emergence of
social tension in the form of mass movements, particularly nonviolent ones, and to a lesser
degree also armed conict. There is also evidence that it has been on the increase in more
recent decades for the case of nonviolent campaigns, in parallel with rising globalization and
the di¤usion of rapid channels of communication. This supports our theoretical link between
economic backwardness and international comparison with better-o¤ peers as a mechanism
that contributes to the eruption of social tension.
Of course, we do not propose economic backwardness as the main explanation for mass
demonstrations or armed civil conict. Instead, we believe that it complements other theories
on the origins of political violence and conict. In particular, it is related to the measures
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of absolute levels of development based on income per capita that have proven to be one
of the most robust explanatory factors in cross-country conict studies. In our ndings,
income levels often do not only become insignicant when included together with economic
backwardness, but actually show that higher income levels increase the likelihood of mass
movements that fall short of armed civil conict. This holds also when we instrument income
levels.
Our results may serve as a warning to governments that missed opportunities for eco-
nomic development will come at the price of mounting social tension and unrest. Economic
development is not only desirable for its own sake, but also because a widening gap between
development leaders and laggards poses serious risks for internal stability in the countries left
behind.
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